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Ross: On the misunderstandings of Ranke

ON THE
MISUNDERSTANDING OF RANKE
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
HIS10RICAL PROFESSION
IN AMERICA
DOROTHY ROSS

TUDIES OF THE ORIGINS of the historical profession
in America generally assume that the first generation to professionalize history understood it, much as we do today, as a specialized, independent discipline, and that these historians misunderstood Ranke.
I would like to amend both those accepted truths. Georg Iggers showed
twenty-five years ago that most American historians emphasized Ranke's methodology apart from his idealist philosophical premises and hence used him
1. G. G. Iggers, "The Image of
as support for their own nominalistic positivism. 1 But that was not true for
Ranke in American and German the founders of the historical profession in the Gilded Age. They were not
Historical Thought;' Histury and
Theory2 (1962): 17-40. "Unable to nominalistic positivists, nor did they interpret Ranke in that way. Moreover,
understand the philosorhic context these founders regarded history not as a separate field of study, but as part
of Ranke's h1storica thought,
American historians detached of a joint field we might call "historico-politics." If the reign of historicoRanke's critical analysis of docupolitics was brief, dissolving by the turn of the century into history and poments, which they understood and
litical
science, it nonetheless illuminates the mentality of the founders as well
which suited their need to give to
history scientific respectability, fium as of those who moved beyond them and set out new programs. The uses
his idealistic philosophy, which was
alien to them .... they believed that to which Ranke was put serves as a red thread through this maze and proa Rankean or scientific approach to vides one clue, among others, to the long-obscured origins of the historical
history consisted in a search fur facts
with little or no attempts at gener- profession in America.
One of the chief sources of misunderstanding, upon which Iggers and most
alization and a rigorous renunciation of all philosophy" (ibid., 18, 21) . subsequent historians have relied, is W. Stull Holt's 1940 essay, "The Idea
of Scientific History in America!' Holt claimed that American historians in
the last quarter of the nineteenth century could be divided clearly into two
camps: those, like Henry and Charles Francis Adams, who were influenced
by natural science and believed the task of the historian was to formulate
"historical
laws or generalizations" (the synthetic positivists); and everyone
2. W. S. Holt, "The Idea of Scientific History in America;' }mtrnal of else, who, with Ranke as a model, believed that "scientific history consisted
the Histury of Ideas 1 (June 1940) : of a search for facts alone, with no laws or generalizations and with a renun352-62, particularly 356-57. Followciation of all philosophy" (the nominalistic positivists). 2 Holt's categories ran
in~ Hoft, Iggers classified Andrew
Dickson White with the synthetic roughshod over the complex historical scene of the Gilded Age, when hispositivists and Herbett Baxter
Adams and Charles Kendall Adams tory began to organize as an academic and professional pursuit. In these forwith the nominalistic ones (Iggers, mative decades, many historians regarded the Rankean search for facts and
"Image of Ranke," 19-21). This classification still lies below the surface the construction of philosophical or lawlike generalizations as indissolubly
of the rich and subtle analysis in linked.
John Higham's Histury: Professional
To recover this original context we need first to abandon our firm sense
Scholarship in America (New York:
Harper & Row, 1973), 98-Ioi.
of the specialized profession which history has become in the twentieth ceo-
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tury. For most of the nineteenth century, the study and the writing of history in America were heterogeneous domains, with diverse and changing affiliations. In largest part, history was understood as a genre of belles lettres and
practiced as such by local patriots and gentry writers. The great romantic
historians Parkman, Prescott, Motley, and Bancroft stood at the head of this
large group, some organized in local and state historical societies. The few
chairs in history at American colleges, like the McLean Professorship of Ancient and Modem History at Harvard College, were mostly occupied by members of this belletristic tradition. For the most part, however, before 1870
history was seldom considered worthy of extensive study or independent instruction in the colleges. In the categories of moral philosophy, history was
not "a distinct science, but ... handmaid to them all." Most often in American colleges it was joined to the study of American political institutions. 3
One independent professorship of history, awarded to Andrew Dickson
White at the University of Michigan in 1857, reflected the close tie between
historical and political instruction. White was first drawn to history by his
interest in politics and the accelerating conflict over slavery. His conception
of history was shaped in part by his work as an undergraduate and master's
student at Yale under Theodore Dwight Woolsey. Woolsey was a fervid disciple of Francis Lieber, Professor of History and Political Science at Columbia College in New York and author of a seminal text, On Civil Liberty and
Self-Gapernment. White was thus exposed to Lieber's conception of the close
connection between history and politics, reflected in his joint chair and in
the method and content of his historico-political writings. White was also
inspired by Thomas Arnold, Regius Professor of History at Oxford. Arnold's
critical historiographical method and sophisticated understanding of institutions, as well as his Teutonism, his belief that nations develop according to
historical laws, and his presentist aim to bring historical understanding to
bear on contemporary political problems all formed common ground with
Lieber's conception of political science and provided a platform on which
American historians could link their studies to his. White claimed his primary purpose in teaching history was to promote "better training in thought
regarding our great national problems." After an interlude in active politics,
he became president of Cornell University in 1867 and promptly announced,
on paper at least, a "School of Political Science" which embraced history,
politics, law, and economics, as well as lectures on "social science'' as the scientific study of what were called the dependent, delinquent, and defective
classes. Political science, in other words, was the generic term for all the historical and social sciences. In reality, the largest component of White's "School
of Political Science'' was history. 4

g

S IT TURNED OUT, the central figures in the movement
to institutionalize and professionalize history in the reformed
universities in the 1870s and 188os were advocates of this activist
and political conception of history. Herbert Baxter Adams, John W. Burgess, Charles Kendall Adams, Albert Bushnell Hart, and White himself were
the moving figures behind the organization of the American Historical Association (AHA) and the leaders of the first major professional university
departments in history. Papers on contemporary politics were frequently given
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3· David D. Van Tassel, Recording
America's Past: An Interpretation of
the Development of Historical Studies
in America, 16o7-1lJ84. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1960);
George H. Callcott, Histury in the
UnitEd StutEs, 18oo-186o (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press,
1970); Robert L. Church, "The Development of the Social Sciences as
Academic Disciplines at Harvard
University, 1869-1900," Ph.D. diss.,
Harvard University, 1965; Norman
Fiering, "President Samuel Johnson
and the Circle of Knowledge," William and Mary Q;mrterly 28 (April
1971): 217; Anna Haddow, Political
Science in American Colleges and
Universities, 1636-1900 (New York:
Appleton-Century, 1939).
4· A. D. White, "How I Was Educated;' Ftlrnm 2 (February 1887):
572-73; idem, The Autobiogmphy of
And~rW Diclwn WhilE, 2 vols. (New
York: Century, 1905), 1:256-62;
2:384; T. D. Woolsey, "Introduction
to the Third Edition;' in F. Lieber,
On Civil Liberty and Self-Guvernment,
3d ed. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1877), 5-6; White to Daniel
Coit Gilman, 2 February and 5
March 1883, Gilman Papers, The
Johns HoJ?kins University; Haddow, Politu:al Science in American
Collqp, 189-92; T. Arnold, Introductory Iatures on Modern History (New
York: D. Appleton, 1845); Duncan
Forbes, The Liberal Anglican Idea of
Histury (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1952). On Lieber:
"On History and Political Economy
as Necessary Branches of Superior
Education in Free States;' in The

Miscellaneous Writi'!t}l" ofFrancis Lieber, ed. D. C. Gilman, 2 vols.

(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott,
188o), 1:179-203, and "History and
Political Science Necessary Studies
in Free Countries;' in Writi'!t}l" of
Lieber, 2:329-68; Frank Friedel,
Francis Lieber: NinetEenth Century
Liberal (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1947).
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5. Papers of the American Histurical
Association I, no. I (I885): 6, 8, I4-I5;

no. 6 (I885): 463-64; vol. 2, no. I
(1886): I96--97. D. Van Tassel, "From
Learned Society to Professional Organization: The American Historical Association, I884-I9oo,"
American Histurical Review (AHK) 89
(October I98+): 929-56, pointed out
a connection between history and
political science in the founding
generation of professional historians, as has Marvin E. Gettleman,
ed., The Johns Hopkins University

Seminary of Histury and Politics,
(New York: Garland,
I987), Introduction . Church discussed the activist impulse of the
dominant group in the profession
in "Development of the Social
Sciences."

1877-1912

6. C. K. Adams, The&lationsofPolitical Science to National Prosperity
(Ann Arbor: University of Michi-

gan, I88I).; Haddow, Political Science
m Ammcan Colleges, 205-8; ]. W.
Burgess, Reminiscences ofan American Scholar (New York: Columbia
University Press, I934); Albion
Small, "Fifty Years of Sociology in
the United States (I865-I9I5);'
American Juurnal ofSociology 2I (May
I9I6) , 728n ; J. W. Burgess, "The
Study of the Political Sciences in
Columbia CoUege," IntErnational&view I2 (April I882): 3+6-5I; R. Gordon Hoxie et al. , A Histury of the

Faculty of Political Science, Columbia
University (New York: Columbia
University Press, I955); D. G. Brinton Thompson, Rutifles of New York
(New York: Columbia University
Press, 1946).
7. H. B. Adams, "New Methods of
Study in History;' Juurnal of Social
Science I8 (I88+): 227-29, 262-63;
idem, "Is History Past Politics?"

Johns Hopkins University Studies in
History and Political Science
(jHUSHPS) , ser. I3, no. 4 (I895):
7&-8o; D. C. Gilman, "Introductory
NotC:' in F. Lieber, On Civil Liberty
and Sc!fGovernment, 4th ed., ed. T.
D. Woolsey (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, I90I); John Martin Vincent, "Herbert Baxter Adams;' in
American Mastm ofSocial Science, ed.
H. Odum (New York: Henry Holt,
I927), 99-130; Richard T. Ely, "A
Sketch of the Life and Services of
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at the AHA, and White and Herbert Adams referred to the association repeatedly in the early years as an organization dedicated to the study of history
and politics. The governmental Washington tie that Adams worked so assiduously to maintain for the AHA was a product of that joint vision. Nor was
it mere accident or economy that the departments they organized, like the
publication series they began, were jointly in history and political science.
To these men, history and political science were two aspects of the same large
field, and it was the joint field which they intended to establish. 5
Charles Kendall Adams, White's student, carried on his conception and
presided over the establishment of a School of Political Science at Michigan
in r88r. By that date, John W. Burgess had given "the political sciences" an
added prominence. Burgess too was drawn toward politics by his Civil War
experience. Then, as a student ofJulius Seelye at Amherst College, he read
Lieber and upon graduation enrolled in Columbia Law School to study with
him. Forced to withdraw because of illness, he decided instead to read law
in a private office and then to study history and the Staatswissenschaften in
Germany. In 1877 he went to Columbia, where a group of trustees and fuculty
allied to Samuel Ruggles, a wealthy New York cosmopolitan interested in
modernizing the college, recognized Burgess as a fitting successor to Lieber.
By r88o he and the liberal trustees had launched a School of Political Science.
Cast along the inclusive lines White had conceived, Burgess's larger permanent staff and ambitious graduate program immediately set a new standard
for the field. 6
Herbert Baxter Adams was moving in a similar direction. Adams too had
read Lieber under Seelye at Amherst and studied both political science and
history in Germany. His major professor was Johann Bluntschli at Heidelberg, himself an admirer of Lieber, who joined the idealist and historical
branches of Staatswissenschaft into a single theory of the State. Applying for
a position at The Johns Hopkins University, Adams said he wanted "to pursue historical researches and to contribute something to Political Science."
With President Daniel Coit Gilman, another Lieber disciple, he began a graduate seminar and then a publication series in "History and Political Science."
Spurred on by Burgess's success at Columbia, he hoped for more money to
construct "a great school of History and Politics;' one that would "command
for her graduates the Washington situation;' so that "when experts are
needed . .. they will be taken from this university;' but Gilman did not have
the money to provide. 7
Adams held on, however, to his vision of the joint field. When his coveted
professorship was offered in 1890, he was chagrined to learn that it was to
be in ''American and Institutional History." The term ''American history;'
he told Gilman, conveyed neither the cosmopolitan scope of his teaching
nor his aim .

What I really represent in this University is the practical union ofHisrory and Politics. That combination is the main strength ofmy department. The spirit of my work and of our University Studies in Hisrory
and Politics has been commended in this country and in Germany because it illustrates precisely that intimate blending of historical and
political science which Bluntschli and Lieber, Arnold and Freeman
regarded as inseparable. The term ((Institutional Hisrory)) llY aHistori-
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cal Politics)) fairly expresses the spirit of the motto printed upon our
University Studies and Seminary wall. . . .
-the motto adopted from Freeman (Arnold's successor in the Rt:gius chair
and a fulsome Teutonist): "History is past politics, and politics are present
history." While later generations of social historians attacked Adams's conception of the close tie between history and politics as exclusive and narrowing, Adams in fact regarded historico-politics as opening out to the other
social sciences. His category of the "political" was Aristotle's, he claimed, and
included anything that "affects the common life of the society." He encouraged
his students to pursue anthropological and socioeconomic topics. Politics
was the defining context for Adams and his colleagues because they believed
that politics was the most fundamental and inclusive element in the progress
of civilization. 8

HAT TIED THE FIELDS of history and politics together
was that both subjects were understood to be engaged in the
same task: the discovery of fundamental historical principles
upon which to base current political action. For Americans, these historical
principles were not difficult to find. As Lieber stated it, the most important
principle to be learned from historical study was that of"Teutonic individual
independence, especially developed in Anglican liberty and self-government!'
These Anglican principles, as he called them, were "the leading subject of
Western history and the characteristic stamp and feature of our race, our age,
our own country and its calling."9 Though originally a German emigre, Lieber had quickly tuned himself to the American voice, blending his Kantian
liberalism into the principles of American exceptionalism which pervaded
American politics and culture. The task of historico-politics was to verify,
strengthen, and preach those principles of civil liberty which Americans believed themselves to have inherited from their Teutonic ancestors and established forever in their own republican institutions. It was a task which
manifestly required a concern for both fuct and generalization.
If we look at the historical causes behind the reform of the colleges and
the rapid expansion of advanced studies in the 187os and 188os, it is clear why
those historians who understood their field as directly relevant to political
action were the ones who took the professional lead. Historico-politics, like
other loosely constructed fields of humane learning in America, was galvanized
into self-consciousness by a profound cultural and social crisis which gathered
force through the Gilded Age. On one level, the crisis was one of intellectual
authority, as science increasingly discredited the apologetic stance and naive
resort to Divine Providence of the established voices in American culture.
On another level, the crisis was broadly social and political, as civil war, reconstruction, and then rapid industrialization appeared to test whether America
could sustain the principles which defined its place in history.
To this crisis the leaders in historico-politics had a ready answer. More
activist than their belletristic colleagues, but like them as members of a respectable, educated class which feared popular democracy, they offered to
reformulate American principles on the firm ground of science and to train
a leadership class which would use the lessons of history to guide America
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Herbert Baxter Adams;' Herbert
Baxter Atklms. Tributes of Friends,
JHUSHPS, ser. 20, extra no. (1902);
H . B. Adams to D. C. Gilman, 21
May 1876, quoted in W. Stull Holt,
"Historical Scholarship in the
United States, !876-1901: As Revealed in the Correspondence of
Herbert Baxter Adams," JHUSHPS,
ser. 54, no. 4 (1938): 32; H. B. Adams
to D. C. Gilman, 4 March 1887,
Herbert Baxter Adams Papers, The
Johns Hopkins University; H. B.
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8. H. B. Adams to D. C. Gilman,
19 December 1890, Adams Papers.
Note that this letter, as well as the
letter urging his connection with
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from the Holt collection. The
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Collections, The Johns Hopkins
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interests, see ibid., n October, 19
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April, 14 November 1884; 23 October, 4 December 1885; 5 November 1886; 13 January 1888.
9. Lieber, On Civil Liberty and SelfGuvernment, 3d ed. (Philadelphia:
J. B. Lippincott, 1877), 21.
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10. A. D. White, Education in Political Science (Baltimore: John Murphy, 1879), especially 34-35; H. B.

Adams, "Is History Past Politics?"
8o-81; Burgess, "The Study of the
Political Sc1ences;' 346. Also C. K.

Adams, Relations ofPolitical Science,

A Manual ofHisturical
Lillmlture (New York: Harpers,

11-15; idem,

1882), 16-2+.

rr. James J. Sheehan, German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century
(Chicago: Universiry of Chicago
Press, 1978), 19-21, 87-89, 106, 114,
150, 156; Wilhelm Mommsen,
"Ranke and the Neo-Rankean
School in Imperial Germany: StateOriented Historiography as a
Stabilizing Force in the PostRevolutionary Nation State," in The

Shape of Histury: Essays on the Centennial of the Death of Leopold ron
Ranke, ed. G. Iggers and J. Powell
(submitted for publication, Syracuse Universiry Press); Thomas R.
Osborne, A "Grande Ecole'' for the
"Grands Corps" (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1983),
chaps. 7 and 12.
12. Michael Kammen, "Moses Coit
Tyler: The First Professor of American History in the United States;'
The Histury Teacher 17 (November
1983): 61-85; Church, "Development
of the Social Sciences;' chap. +·

into the future. Their new departments of history and political science would
be used, according to White, "for the checking of popular unreason, and
for the spreading of right reason." As Herbert Adams said, "In the improvement of the existing social order, what the world needs is historical enlightenment and political and social progress along existing institutional lines. We
must preserve the continuity of our past life in the State... ?'As Burgess feared,
"unless a sounder political wisdom and a better political practice be attained,
the republican system may become but a form, and republican institutions
but a deception." The task of historico-politics was to preserve American
republican principles in the midst of crisis. 10
When the American students of historico-politics went abroad, they
confirmed their native fears and the broad lines of their solution. Moderate
German liberals like Bluntschli were also concerned with the threat of class
conflict and mass democratic politics and were also developing a historical
political science that could withstand those threats. As Mommsen shows,
the neo-Rankean historians oflmperial Germany formed a particularly close
parallel to the Americans. They too responded to the socioeconomic threats
of industrialization by affirming "the great continuities" of German and European history. In France, too, Burgess found at the Ecole Libre des Sciences
Politiques a like-minded bourgeois elite intent upon strengthening its leadership role through historical, scientific education. The establishment of
historico-politics in America was part of the wider effort of Western-educated
classes to defend a precarious patrimony and class position by reinvigorating
their cultural power. 11
Adherents of historico-politics, then, were at the center of professional
organization during the 1870S and r88os, but other kinds of historians who
did not fully share their views also joined their labors and moved into university chairs in history. Moses Coit Tyler, for example, whose background was
in belles lettres and whose interest was the history of American literature and
culture, was appointed at Cornell in r881. Other young institutional historians,
like Ephraim Emerton at Harvard, were skeptical of political activism .12 But
there was at first little conflict generated by these divergent historical tendencies. The substantive agreement among all historians on the importance
of those ''Anglican principles of self-government" aided in forming a common identity. Whether appearing in the aging rhetoric of Bancroft's magnum opus, or in Emerton's subtle analysis of the institutional growth of
Anglo-Saxon legal principles, or in Burgess's laws of historico-politics, these
substantive principles created a family resemblance through the joint field
of history and political science in the Gilded Age.

i

F THE UNION of history and politics was well suited to the
early decades of professionalization, so too were the epistemological premises that allowed these founders to claim knowledge of
histoncal principles. They worked from forms of idealism or common-sense
realism that made it possible for them to believe in the discovery of both
fact and principle. Rankean method, usually placed on the sides of both fact
and general truth, was fitted into their inherited philosophical premises.
When we turn from their sociocultural purposes to their epistemological
foundations, however, we enter on more obscure terrain. They were not
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philosophically naive; indeed, having studied in the antebellum college, where
philosophy stood at the apex of the curriculum, and then having studied
in Germany, where every subject offered epistemological credentials, they were
philosophically more concerned than the younger historians and political
scientists whom they imperfectly educated in their specialized new programs
in the United States. But they were not philosophically sophisticated either
and did not write much about their underlying premises, just as they did
not teach much about them. Although they did not believe that science
precluded all philosophy, it did seem to them to rule out that kind of philosophy which had religious or metaphysical intentions. Probably they wished
to avoid that contested ground altogether and at the same time escape the
orthodox scrutiny which still watched over the colleges in the Gilded Age.
Burgess was the most outspoken about his philosophical assumptions, and
he was unmistakably a Hegelian idealist. Julius Seelye, his teacher at Amherst, was a partial disciple of Laurens Hickok, an early American idealist,
and Burgess claimed Seelye's inspiration for his belief in "a universal reason
as the real substance of all things, of which each individual man is the microcosm." After his German studies, he followed Hegel. Reason, he believed,
was progressively revealed in history, and "the product of the progressive revelation of human reason through history" was the State.13 The task of political science was first to arrange "the facts of history in the forms and conclusions
of science;' but then to discern in those facts "political ideals not yet realized. Thrown into the form of propositions, these ideals become principles
of political science, then articles of political creeds, and at last, laws and institutions." The process of"philosophical speculation" was thus to Burgess
"the most important element in political science, because it lights the way
of progress."14 Burgess stands at one end of the spectrum of this group of
historico-political scientists: he was the most deeply rooted in philosophical
idealism and the most concerned with the principles of politics as against
the particulars of history. In time, he was willing to divide the labor of his
joint field, with historians given the preliminary work of discerning and arranging the facts for the higher tasks of political scientists. But still, Burgess's
political enterprise remained rooted in history, and he wrote works of history as well as politics. His chief inspiration, he always claimed, and the person to whom his major work was dedicated, was Gustav Droysen. Given
Burgess's idealist ambitions, it is not surprising that he went to Droysen for
historical method and that he praised Ranke for having a "fur-reaching, allembracing philosophic outlook." 15
Hart stands one step over from Burgess. The only record he left of his
philosophy was in his presidential address to the AHA in 1909, and there
he presented himself as half an idealist, of a peculiarly American sort. History is, in part, Hart said, like science, not only in its critical methods and
dispassionate attitudes, but in its use of the empirical method of Darwin,
the method of accumulating and sifting evidence until "by its own weight
it seeks the only outlet .. . . data full together in harmonious wholes; the mind
is led to the discovery oflaws; and the explorer into scientific truth is at last
able to formulate some of those unsuspected generalizations which explain
the whole framework of the universe." Yet, Hart went on, history is not like
science because it deals ultimately with mind. In recognizing human motives, in selecting the facts, and in exercising that "dramatic instinct" which dis-
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Interpretation of History;' AHR
18 [July 1913]: 702-3. Cf. Iggers, "Image of Ranke;' 23-24).
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cerns "whither a people is tending'' and what "has carried forward civilization;' the historian must use the imagination, which Hart defined as "that
high quality of the mind which makes us see things as they are." Here Hart's
quotations are to Emerson, Shelley, Wordsworth, and Blake. Hart said he
was led to study history by work at Harvard College with the aesthete Charles
Eliot Norton in the history of art. 16
What is striking, of course, is Hart's combining scientific empiricism and
romantic idealism without any sense of disjunction. He seemed to accept
both the scientists' claim that their empirical generalizations could "explain
the whole framework of the universe" and the romantic's claim that imagination "makes us see things as they are." In his study of national ideals, a
subject presumably requiring an idealist insight, he honored Darwin, "the
great historical master of our age;' and asserted that "human institutions also
follow a law of natural selection." 17 The best explanation for Hart's mixed
epistemology-beyond philosophical incapacity-is the apologetic, syncretistic
philosophical impulse which long dominated American culture. Most American colleges taught, as did the Harvard that Hart attended, a form of
common-sense realism in which rational reflection upon the data of sense
experience and upon the intuitions of mind and conscience was thought to
yield true knowledge of both nature and God. In this view, the truths of
matter and spirit were understood to be congruent, and science and religion,
mutually reinforcing. While a few American romantic idealists (Norton among
them) escaped this harmonizing tradition, the tendency of most Americans
was to paper over the cracks that appeared between mind and nature. On
one level, Hart was aware of differences, but on another, he could not help
thinking that Darwinian empiricism and romantic imagination alike revealed
the true nature of things and alike created a single harmonious body of
truths. 18
Hart's vision, then, was fundamentally American. His studies in Germany
appear to have been primarily with von Holst at Freiburg on American history. In a presidential address crowded with references, hardly a German name
appeared. Ranke did appear briefly as an example of positivism, as against
Hart's own idealism. It was all very well for Ranke to say "I will simply tell
you how it was;' Hart chided, but he really told us "'how it was' as seen
through the mind of Ranke." In his distance from German sources, Hart
picked up here what had become by 1909 the common view of Ranke, a view
put forward primarily by the younger generation of historians who were themselves more nominalistic and positivistic than Hart and the older founders. 19

it

ERBERT ADAMS stood more squarely within the American tradition of common-sense realism. Like Burgess, he studied first with Seelye at Amherst, but he seems to have been less
influenced by Seelye's idealism. In the one defense Adams made of his view
of history as past politics, he did not, like Burgess, claim that the State was
the highest realization of reason, but rather relied on empirical historical traditions going back to Aristotle's civic humanism. I have found only one statement of his philosophy, among his unpublished papers; it appears to be a
letter or fragment of a lecture, which could date from r88o or 1894.
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Any Science is to be defined as Truth. By Science I mean ci<Jsely n:/ated
[organized, classified] knowledge. Truth ai<Jne can be knmvn, even about
a lie. History is a Science, ie History is Truth. History is Truth about
the ConditWns and Causes under which and because ofwhich any person, institution, custom, or what-you-please originated, developed, attained maturity, decayed . .. . Ranke's admonition «Write the Truth''
is superogatory [sic], no man can dfJ other and write History; Druysen's
«self-knowledge" is but a fragment of History, unless the interdependence ofall knowledge begranted; Fn:eman's «Unity ofHistory" is but
the Unity of Truth. Phiwsophy touches all science on the side of abstract thought, History is Phiwsophy concn:tized and vocalized. History is the All-compn:hensive Science.
Adams's capitalized "Truth" and his statement, "Truth alone can be known;'
seem to express his fundamental realism. At this level, Ranke's methodological injunction is transcended. Adams's common-sense realism is expressed in
his rejection of Droysen's idealism (history as "self-knowledge'') in favor of
"the interdependence of all knowledge." History was an empirical science of
causes and conditions which, as common-sense thinkers claimed, yielded
truths consonant with the rational truths of philosophy. 20
Adams never publicly stated this philosophy, but he did stress a conception of historical methodology consistent with common-sense realism, one
which gave equal weight to both empirical science and synthetic truths. Adams
was always talking of"the continuity of human history'' and urging his students to choose special topics that would lead out to "universal history." Ranke
was, for Adams, one of the great masters who combined both aspects of historical methodology. In Adams's essay on Ranke at the AHA in 1887 and in
his later writings and comments to students, he presented Ranke partly as
the master of a new scientific method which deals critically with sources and
eschews the moralistic and religious commentary of older historians. It was
to refute this older practice of moralizing that Adams praised Ranke for always giving "the facts." But Ranke was at the same time held up as the master of universal history, a "Weltgeist, discerning vast unities where other men
had seen only infinite particulars." Ranke understood, said Adams, that "History is in its very nature universal!' All his studies of the particular were really
studies in universal history, for he saw individual countries "as illustrations
of world-historic ideas of religion, freedom, law, and government, expressed
or realized by individual European states." Adams was willing to accept Ranke's
world historic ideas, along with the principles of Lieber and Bluntschli, Arnold
and Freeman, as examples of the universal truths embedded in history and
discoverable by empirical investigation. 21
If Burgess was a Hegelian idealist and Hart and Adams adherents of eclectic
versions of common-sense realism, White was influenced by positivism. In
his first academic appointment teaching history at Michigan between 1857 and
1862, White started reading Buckle, Lecky, and the American positivist, William Draper, just as Darwin and Spencer began to break upon American consciousness. This led him, he remembered, to think of history as "less and
less a matter of annals, and more and more a record of the unfolding of humanity."22 The result was a view of history in fact very similar to that of Adams,
for synthetic positivism as well as idealism could be absorbed into the eclec-
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tic native philosophy. White advocated for historians the "union of close scientific analysis with a large philosophic synthesis."23
White's presidential address to the opening meeting of the AHA in 1884
was titled "On Studies in General History and the History of Civilization;'
and his purpose was to urge the new profession to move onto that large terrain. Using Buckle's authority, he claimed that empirical scientific method
began with observation, moved to discovery, and then ended in a philosophical method of synthesis. Here White was pushing inductive science into the
realm of synthetic philosophy even further than Buckle himself occasionally
seemed to do. Underlying this strategy must have been the American belief
that empirical generalizations and rational truths formed a single body of truth.
White listed as exemplars of the mutually nurturant relationship between
special studies and synthetic history Voltaire, Guizot, Gibbon, Lecky, Bancroft, Draper minus his analogy between individual and national development, Vico, Lazarus, the world histories of Leo and Ranke, and finally, the
special studies of Ranke, Mommsen, and Droysen, which were written in
the same world historical spirit. Clearly the "laws of development" and of
"relations" which White hoped to get from history were not understood in
an exclusively positivistic manner. He criticized Spencer for trying to limit
historians to material causes and statistical study, because the observation of
thought, character, and institutions was far more revealing of the broad principles of history. "Moral proof;' by which White seemed to mean historians'
understanding of the motives of their subjects, was, he said, far superior to
statistics in getting at "truth." If White's conception of history was grounded
in positivism, he was not confined by it. 24
24· Ibid., 6-27.
White's student, Charles Adams, seems to have had little in the way of
philosophical training, and it is clear from his sizable Manual of Historical
Literature (1882) that he had no firsthand knowledge of the German idealists.
He may well have accepted White's eclectic and synthetic positivism, for he
always echoed the call to study facts in their larger relations, urging that without a correct idea of"the whole'' to begin with there was no way to reach
25. C. K. Adams, "On Methods of an understanding of the parts. 25 Like Herbert Adams and White, he praised
Teaching History;' in Methods of
both the empirical and the synthetic Ranke. In his Manual, he said that
Teaching History, 2d ed., ed. G. S.
Ranke's greatness lay in his "masterly generalizations;' in the "deep insight
Hall (Boston : Ginn, 1885), 203-4.
with which he penetrates to the very bottom of affuirs, and brings the causes
and the springs of action into the light;' and in his ability to show "the real
26. C. K. Adams, Manual, 25-30,
influence and significance of events.m 6 By 1889, in an address to the AHA
199, 303, 46o.
about the progress of historical work in Europe and America, it was Ranke's
historical seminary, with its new rules of evidence and investigation from original sources, that he featured. Still, he made clear in that speech, by his praise
of John Seeley's program in historico-politics at Cambridge, that he still ad27. C. K. Adams, "Recent Historihered to a view of history like that of his mentor. 27

23. A. D. White, "On Studies in
General History and the History of
Civilization;' Papers of the AHA 1,
no. 2 (1885): 25.

cal Work in the Colleges and
Universities in Europe and
America;' Papers ofthe AHA 4, no.
1 (1889) : 19-42, especially 30.

UCH WERE THE VARIED but related grounds on
which these five men sought to found the joint field of
historico-politics in America. They hoped to produce historical writing that was empirical and synthetic; that was impartial, naturalistic,
and scientific in its discovery and statement of facts, but philosophic in its
discernment of fundamental historical principles. For four of the five mem-
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bers of this group, Ranke was understood as a model for both aspects of their
enterprise.
Why then did their students not follow in their footsteps? The historians
who succeeded these founders-George Burton Adams, Charles McLean
Andrews, Herbert Levi Osgood, John Franklin Jameson, Frederick Jackson
Turner, James Harvey Robinson, Edward P. Cheyney-were, to begin with,
moved even more strongly than their elders by the desire to attain the modern authority of science. 28 For the older group, it was enough to forswear
supernatural knowledge and to add the new empirical methods onto their
older philosophical conceptions. But the standards of science were tightening during the late nineteenth century. Whereas earlier science had been
understood as "organized knowledge," loosely connected to empirical observation, scientists now demanded that generalizations reflect only the observed
natural facts. By the newer standards of critical positivism, the synthetic generalizations. of the earlier positivists and idealists looked like metaphysical constructs. 29 For Americans it was easy to fall back on a nominalistic empiricism
as the proper ground for an authentic science. Baconian empiricism, based
on common-sense realism, had early become the dominant method of inquiry in America. For the heirs of this tradition, induction from observed
facts and skepticism regarding preformed generalizations seemed the highroad to science.
The second wave of professional historians were also more strongly influenced by historicism than their elders were. The modern, historicist conception of history as a self-contained and continuous process of qualitative
change did not have much impact in America until the closing decades of
the nineteenth century. 30 American recognition of the difference between
past and future had been blocked by a millennia! conception of the American republic in which the past appeared as prologue and the future as fulfillment of America's republican destiny. It was still this early-modern conception
of history which inspired the elders of historico-politics in their search for
historical principles that would guide political practice into the future. The
newer, more critically scientific historians rejected the millennia! framework
of American history and self-consciously asserted the difference of past and
future. They broke the Teutonic chain and the republican cycles on which
the principles of American civil liberty had been based, and showed that
historians must understand all things in the context of their own time and
place.
It is easy to see how these more empiricist and contextual commitments
could converge and lead these younger historians to criticize the work and
attitudes of their elders. This is the intellectual background behind the professional "revolt" of the 1890s which David Van Tassel discovered in the AHA. 31
At the same time, the joint field ofhistorico-politics was also splitting apart.
Indeed, in calling these younger scholars "historians;' I am recognizing that
the second wave of scholars in this joint field had self-consciously identified
with either history or political science. The political counterparts of Andrews,
Jameson, and Turner were Frank Goodnow, Woodrow Wilson, and Westel
W. Willoughby, and in 1904 they broke off from the AHA and formed their
own American Political Science Association.
On one level, the split was a product of diverging interests compounded
by rising professionalism. While political scientists were centrally concerned
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with contemporary politics, most historians, whether descended from the
belletristic tradition or simply engrossed in the demands of the Rankean reconstruction of the past, were not . In the rapidly enlarging and decentralized
university system, specialization was relatively easy to effect and carried the
status rewards of institutional and disciplinary independence. But beneath
these professional concerns were the divergent uses to which historians and
political scientists put their new historicism and positivism.
The line of fissure appeared along the widening gap between past and future. As the acceptance and understanding of historicism deepened, those
scholars most interested in recovering the past increasingly recognized the
difficulty of their task. Mindful as well of the empirical demands of science,
they opted for the close, detailed contextual reconstruction of the past. To
those students of historico-politics who wanted above all to guide present
and future political practice, however, historicism suggested that past experience, being different, was not of much use. Politics must be studied in
the context of the present. More than that, if firm principles were to be developed to guide action, they could no more rest on present history than
past, for the future would be different again. Thus the political scientists,
anxious for usefulness and practical power, sought a model of natural process within or beneath histoty on which to ground their principles. While
historians learned to historicize the principles of American civil liberty and
to accept the guidance they could provide in that more limited and insecure
form, the political scientists sought grounds in nature for the norms of American political practice.
Historico-politics was thus a transitional moment in the professionalization of both history and political science in the United States. Recognizing
this fact allows us to clarify the understanding of Ranke and the dynamics
of professionalization, but its implications extend further, beyond the limits
of this paper. The milieu of historico-politics allows us to see how centrally
the American historical profession was tied to the national ideology of American exceptionalism. It also alerts us to the fact that the presentism, the synthetic aim, and the sympathy with the social sciences that we associate with
the "New History" of the Progressive period were central to the profession
at its origin in the Gilded Age. As historians well know, new origins will
require altering many features of the development
which followed .
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Letter to Clam Graves Ranke from her mother, dated r8 May 1848.
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